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Abstract 
Project promoters, forecasters, and managers sometimes object to two things in 
measuring inaccuracy in travel demand forecasting: (1) using the forecast made at the 
time of making the decision to build as the basis for measuring inaccuracy and (2) using 
traffic during the first year of operations as the basis for measurement. This paper 
presents the case against both objections. First, if one is interested in learning whether 
decisions about building transport infrastructure are based on reliable information, then it 
is exactly the traffic forecasted at the time of making the decision to build that is of 
interest. Second, although ideally studies should take into account so-called demand 
"ramp up" over a period of years, the empirical evidence and practical considerations do 
not support this ideal requirement, at least not for large-N studies. Finally, the paper 
argues that large samples of inaccuracy in travel demand forecasts are likely to be 
conservatively biased, i.e., accuracy in travel demand forecasts estimated from such 
samples would likely be higher than accuracy in travel demand forecasts in the project 
population. This bias must be taken into account when interpreting the results from 
statistical analyses of inaccuracy in travel demand forecasting. 
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Introduction 
As pointed out by Pickrell (1990) and Richmond (1998), estimates of the financial 
viability of projects are heavily dependent on the accuracy of travel demand forecasts. 
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Such forecasts are also the basis for socio-economic and environmental appraisal of 
transportation infrastructure projects. According to the experiences gained with the 
accuracy of demand forecasting in the transportation sector, covering traffic volumes, 
spatial traffic distribution, and distribution between transportation modes, there is 
evidence that demand forecasting--like cost forecasting, and despite all scientific 
progress in modeling--is a major source of uncertainty and risk in the appraisal of 
transportation infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003). 
 Travel demand forecasts are routinely used to dimension the construction of 
transportation infrastructure projects. Here accuracy in forecasts is a point of 
considerable importance to the effective allocation of scarce funds. For example, 
Bangkok's US$2 billion Skytrain was hugely overdimensioned because the passenger 
forecast was 2.5 times higher than actual traffic. As a result, station platforms are too 
long for the shortened trains that now operate the system, a large number of trains and 
cars are idly parked in the train garage because there is no need for them, terminals are 
too large, etc. The project company has ended up in financial trouble and even though 
urban rail is probably a good idea for a congested and air-polluted city like Bangkok, 
overinvesting in idle capacity is hardly the best way to use resources, and especially not 
in a developing nation where capital for investment is scarce. Conversely, a UK National 
Audit Office study identified a number of road projects that were underdimensioned 
because traffic forecasts were too low. This, too, led to multi-million-dollar 
inefficiencies, because it is considerably more expensive to add capacity to existing fully 
used roads than it is to build the capacity up front (National Audit Office 1988). For 
these and other reasons, accuracy in travel demand forecasts matters, as also pointed out 
by Hugosson (2005) elsewhere in this issue. 
 Nevertheless, rigorous studies of accuracy are rare, as are discussions of the 
methodological problems involved in measuring accuracy. Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 
(2005), presents the first statistically significant study of accuracy in travel demand 
 5/18 
forecasting, based on analyses of 210 forecasts. In what follows, the methodological 
considerations involved in measuring accuracy are expounded. 
 
 
Defining Inaccuracy 
In order to estimate the accuracy of travel demand forecasts it is necessary to compare 
forecasted with actual demand. It is common practice to define the inaccuracy of a 
demand forecast as actual minus forecasted demand in percentage of forecasted demand: 
 
 I = ((Ta - Tf) x 100)/ Tf 
 
where 
 
I = inaccuracy in percent 
Ta = actual travel demand 
Tf = forecasted travel demand 
 
Actual demand is typically counted for the first year of operations (or the opening year). 
Forecasted demand is typically the estimate for the first year of operations (or the 
opening year) as estimated at the time of decision to build the project (the time the 
project was formally given the go-ahead).  
 Thus the forecast for a given project is the estimate that was available to decision 
makers when they made the decision to build the project. By measuring inaccuracy in 
relation to this base year one provides an answer to the question of whether the decision 
to build was an informed one, that is, whether the decision was based on accurate 
information, here accurate travel forecasts. If no estimate of travel demand was available 
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at the time of decision to build, then the closest available estimate is typically used, often 
a later estimate resulting in a conservative bias in the measure for inaccuracy.  
 With this definition of inaccuracy, perfect accuracy is indicated by zero; an 
inaccuracy of minus 40 percent, for example, would indicate that actual traffic were 40 
percent lower than forecasted traffic, whereas an inaccuracy of plus 40 percent would 
mean that actual traffic were 40 percent higher than forecasted traffic. 
 Below, the pros and cons of this way of defining and measuring inaccuracy in 
travel demand forecasts are discussed. 
 
 
Time of Decision to build as Base Year for Measuring Inaccuracy 
Planners and promoters of transportation infrastructure projects sometimes object to 
using the time of decision to build as the base year for measuring inaccuracy (Flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003). They say various forecasts are made at different 
stages of planning and implementation with forecasts typically becoming more accurate 
over time. Thus the forecast at the time of making the decision to build is far from final. 
It is only to be expected, therefore, that such an early estimate would be highly 
inaccurate, and it would be unfair to use this estimate as the basis for assessing the 
accuracy of travel demand forecasting, or so the objection goes.  
 The objection must be rejected, however, because when the focus is on decision 
making, and hence on the accuracy of the information available to decision makers, then 
it is exactly the traffic forecasted at the time of making the decision to build that is of 
primary interest. Otherwise it would be impossible to evaluate whether decisions are 
informed or not. Forecasts made after the decision to build are by definition irrelevant to 
this decision. Whatever the reasons are for inaccurate forecasts, legislators and citizens--
or private investors in the case of privately funded projects--are entitled to know the 
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uncertainty of forecasted traffic and revenues. Otherwise transparency, accountability, 
and good governance will suffer.  
 It is furthermore observed that if the inaccuracy of early traffic estimates were 
simply a matter of incomplete information and inherent difficulties in predicting a distant 
future, as project promoters and forecasters often say it is, then one would expect 
inaccuracies to be random or close to random. Inaccuracies, however, have a striking 
non-random bias just as there are remarkable differences in inaccuracy between modes of 
transportation, as demonstrated by Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2005).  
  
 
The Problem With Demand Ramp Up 
Planners and promoters also sometimes object to using traffic in the first year of 
operations (or in the opening year) as the basis for measuring inaccuracy in forecasts. A 
manager at Eurotunnel, the owner and operator of the Channel tunnel, which is one of 
the projects my colleagues and I have studied, put it in the following manner in a 
comment on some of our previous work: "[I]t is misleading to make judgements about 
success or failure based on traffic revenues in the initial start-up years of the project" 
(letter from Eurotunnel to the author 1999). If projects experience start-up problems, 
which was very much the case for the Chunnel, then this may initially affect traffic 
negatively, but it would only be temporarily and it would be misleading to measure 
inaccuracy of forecasts on that basis, according to this argument. When start-up problems 
are over, normal operations will ensue, traffic will increase, and this should be the basis 
on which inaccuracy is measured, the argument continues. Furthermore, it takes time 
before travelers effectively discover and make use of a new transportation facility and 
change their travel behavior accordingly. Inertia is a factor. A project with lower-than-
forecasted traffic during the first year of operations may well catch up with the forecast a 
few years down the line and it would be more appropriate to measure inaccuracy on that 
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basis. If the first year of operations is used as the basis for comparison, the result would 
be the identification of too many underperforming projects, or so the opponents to using 
this basis argue. 
 At first sight the argument sounds convincing, and in principle (as opposed to in 
practice) there is nothing which prevents using another time period than first year of 
operations as the basis for measuring inaccuracy. One might, for example, decide to use 
the fifth year of operations, because start-up problems might be expected to be ironed out 
by then; while important external changes in for instance land use will not have 
developed fully at this time either.  
 If demand forecasts do not explicitly model demand for the opening year it is 
important to be aware of this. Some forecasts assume so-called demand "ramp up" over 
the first 3-5 years of a scheme up to the full modeled demand.  For example 50 percent 
of total demand in year 1, 80 percent in year 2, etc. By comparing opening years one may 
thus be assessing two sources of uncertainty: the inaccuracy of the modeling itself, and 
the inaccuracy of the assumed ramp up to full demand.  
 In cost-benefit analyses, errors in the ramps up are likely to have a relatively 
minor impact on the total present value of benefits as compared to errors in the forecast 
total demand. Therefore the question is whether a focus on the opening year gives too 
prominent a role to possible ramp-up errors in comparison to their impact on the overall 
benefit-cost ratios of projects. 
 Two measures would solve the issue. One would be to use, e.g., the fifth year to 
compare forecast to actual demand, as mentioned above. The other would be to do 
statistical tests as to whether there is any difference in bias and variability between the 
opening year and the fifth year after opening. Such measures are certainly desirable and 
they may be workable for small-N studies, i.e., studies that cover one or a few projects 
and where the relevant data have been produced and stored.  
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 For large-N studies, i.e., studies covering many projects, these ideal measures 
prove unworkable, however, because in practice only few projects can be found for 
which a travel demand forecast is available for the fifth year of operations and actual 
traffic counts are also available for this year so that inaccuracy may be systematically 
measured for the year. Available studies with statistical comparisons of the first and the 
fifth year are even rarer. Many more projects can be found with available information 
about forecasted and actual traffic for the first year of operations than for later years, 
because it appears to be the most common practice for both forecasters and those who 
evaluate the accuracy of forecasts to use first-year-of-operations as the basis for their 
work (Fouracre et al. 1990, Pickrell 1990, National Audit Office 1992, Walmsley and 
Pickett 1992, World Bank 1994). For this reason, in large-N studies it is advisable to stay 
with first year of operations as the basis for measuring inaccuracy. Essentially, the state-
of-the-art in this specialized area of transportation research is currently such that large-N 
studies will be impossible if this advise is ignored. In addition to this line of reasoning 
the following four arguments support using the first year of operations as the basis for 
measuring forecasting inaccuracy. 
 First, for projects for which data are available on actual and forecasted traffic 
covering more than one year after operations begin, it turns out that projects with lower-
than-forecasted traffic during the first year of operations also tend to have lower-than-
forecasted traffic in later years. Thus using first year of operations as the basis for 
measuring inaccuracy appear not often to result in the error of identifying projects as 
underperforming that would not be identified as such if a different time period were used 
as the basis for comparison. Actual traffic apparently does not quickly catch up with 
forecasted traffic for this type of project, and sometimes it never does. Ramp up may 
initially be assumed, but it does not exist in reality for these projects. For instance, two 
follow-up studies of the urban rail projects analyzed by Pickrell (1990) showed no 
significant gains in patronage over time; for Baltimore, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh 
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patronage actually dropped over time (Richmond 1998, Ryan 2004). For the Channel 
tunnel, more than five years after opening to the public, Eurostar train passengers 
numbered only 45 percent of that forecasted for the opening year; rail freight traffic was 
40 percent of that forecasted; the situation has not improved and the result has been 
several near-bankruptcies. For the Humber bridge in the UK, 16 years after opening to 
the public actual traffic was still only about half of that forecasted. In Denmark, it took 
more than 20 years for actual traffic on the New Little Belt bridge to catch up with 
forecasted traffic, and for several years the difference between forecasted and actual 
traffic grew larger instead of smaller. Assuming ramp up for such projects would lead to 
less accuracy in demand modeling, not more. These findings fit well with Mierzejewski's 
(1995: 31-32) observation that the conventional wisdom in forecasting, that in the long 
run forecasting errors tend to cancel each other out, is wrong; errors often reinforce each 
other with the result that inaccuracy becomes larger when measured against later years as 
compared to when measured against the first year of operations. Following this logic, 
using first year of operations as the basis for measuring inaccuracy would tend to 
underestimate overall inaccuracy of travel demand forecasts. 
 Second, sightseeing traffic may be substantial during the first months of 
operations for the type of large-scale transportation infrastructure project my colleagues 
and I have focused on in our studies, many of which are architectural and engineering 
marvels, in addition to being prosaic transportation machines designed to efficiently get 
people and goods from point A to point B. Sightseeing traffic is traffic attracted by a 
project on the basis of people's desire to see and try the new transportation facility in 
question, for instance a new bridge or a new rail line. To illustrate, for the Øresund 
bridge between Sweden and Denmark, road traffic during the first month of operations 
was 19 percent higher than traffic for the same month one year later. The difference 
between the two months can mainly be ascribed to sightseeing traffic, which was 
somewhat lower than expected by the project company (Trafikministeriet, 
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Finansministeriet, and Sund & Bælt Holding, Ltd. 2002: App. 4:2). Sightseeing traffic 
may help offset the possible negative impacts on travel demand from start-up problems 
etc. mentioned above, at least for projects that are sufficiently attractive in the public's 
eye to warrant sightseeing. The existence of such countervailing influences on traffic 
during the start-up phase of projects help explain why first-year-of-operations tend to be 
a fairly precise basis for measuring inaccuracy in travel demand forecasts for many 
projects. 
 Third, it may be observed as an empirical fact that forecasters and planners 
typically use first-year-of-operations as the principal basis for making their forecasts. 
For a given project, this is generally the main forecast presented to decision makers and 
it forms part of the information decision makers have at hand in making their decision of 
whether to build or not. If one wants to evaluate whether such decisions are informed, 
then it is the accuracy of this forecast that must be evaluated and one must therefore 
compare actual traffic in the first year of operations with forecasted traffic for that year. 
 Fourth and finally, if newly opened transport infrastructure projects have a 
systematic ramp up period before traffic picks up, as claimed by many planners and 
promoters, this should be empirically documented and integrated in travel demand 
modeling. In this way adaption would be reflected in forecasts instead of being external 
to these.  
 In sum, project promoters, forecasters, and managers sometimes object to two 
things in measuring inaccuracy of travel demand forecasts: (1) using the travel demand 
forecast made at the time of making the decision to build as the basis for measuring 
inaccuracy and (2) using traffic during the first year of operations as the basis for 
measurement. However, if one were to follow the objections then it would be virtually 
impossible to make meaningful comparisons of forecasted and actual traffic across large 
numbers of projects and across project types, geographical areas, and time periods 
because no common standard of comparison would be available. Finally, the 
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methodology proposed here as a common standard is already widely used in practice for 
measuring the inaccuracy of travel demand forecasts. This method conveniently allows 
meaningful and consistent comparisons across space and time. 
 
 
Issues of Sampling, Data Collection, and Bias 
Data that allow the calculation of inaccuracies in travel demand forecasts unfortunately 
are relatively rare. For public sector projects, often the data are simply not produced. 
Even where the intention is to produce the data, projects may develop in ways that make 
it difficult or impossible to compare forecasted with actual traffic. For example, 
forecasted traffic for a given project may be estimated for the opening year, but due to 
delays, which are common, the actual opening date turns out to be several years later 
than that forecasted, and no forecast of traffic was made for the actual opening year. In 
more general terms, methodological differences in how and on what basis forecasted and 
actual traffic are estimated often make comparisons difficult or impossible. Finally, for 
large projects the elapse of time from forecasts are made, until decision to build, until 
construction starts, until the project is completed, until operations begin, and until actual 
traffic can finally be counted may cover five, ten, or more years. Over such long time 
periods the assumptions underlying forecasts may be dated and incommensurate when 
compared to the assumptions underlying the way actual traffic is measured, or initial 
plans to compare actual with forecasted traffic may be given up or simply forgotten.  
 For private sector projects, traffic typically generates an income for the project 
owner. Budgeting and accounting is commercial, and therefore travel demand forecasts 
and traffic counts tend to be more systematic and more conducive to comparative studies 
of forecasted and actual traffic than is the case for public sector projects. This typically 
does not help scholars much, however, because traffic data in private projects are often 
classified to keep them from the hands of competitors. And for both public and private 
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projects, data that allow forecasted and actual traffic to be compared may be held back 
by project owners and managers because the size and direction of differences between 
forecasted and actual traffic may be of a kind that, if made public, would make the 
project look bad in the public eye, for instance where actual traffic is substantially lower 
than that forecasted, which is a common situation.  
 Because of this type of problem with data availability and access, scholarly 
studies of the accuracy of travel demand forecasts are rare. Where such studies exist, 
they are characteristically small-N research, i.e., they are single case studies or they 
cover only a small sample of projects (Fouracre et al. 1990, Pickrell 1990, National 
Audit Office 1992, Walmsley and Pickett 1992, World Bank 1994). Consequently, with 
existing data and studies, it has so far been impossible to give statistically satisfying 
answers to questions about how accurate travel demand forecasts are for transportation 
infrastructure projects. As a consequence, planners and analysts have been unable to 
deliver valid and reliable risk assessments for travel demand, even though such 
assessments are a requirement for informed financial appraisal of transportation 
infrastructure projects. 
 As mentioned previously, the study of demand forecasts in 210 transportation 
infrastructure projects reported in Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2005) is the first survey 
sufficiently large to permit statistically valid answers to questions regarding the accuracy 
of travel demand forecasts. To establish a relatively large sample like this, because data 
are so scarce their availability becomes a main criterion for data collection. But just 
because data are available this does not mean they are valid, reliable, and comparable, as 
they must be for systematic analysis. To illustrate, the sample of forecasts in the 210 
projects was established on the basis of data from a much larger group of projects, the 
majority of which were rejected because of unclear or insufficient data quality. Of 485 
projects considered, 275 were rejected in this manner. Of the 275 rejects, 151 projects 
were rejected because inaccuracies for travel demand forecasts in these projects turned 
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out to have been estimated on the basis of adjusted data for actual traffic instead of using 
original, real count data, which is more valid; 124 projects were rejected because 
inaccuracy had been estimated in ways different from and incomparable to the way 
inaccuracy is defined above. In other words, of the 485 observations only 210 were 
considered valid, reliable, and comparable. Such quality control of data and rejection of 
data with low quality is crucial to arriving at useful results when measuring inaccuracy in 
travel demand forecasting. 
 For any sample, a key question is whether it is representative of the population. 
For a sample where data availability is crucial to sampling, this question translates into 
one of whether projects with available data are likely to be representative. There are four 
reasons why this question must be answered in the negative for transportation 
infrastructure projects with data on the inaccuracy of demand forecasts.  
 First, it has been argued that the very existence of data that make the evaluation 
of performance possible--here performance regarding the accuracy of forecasts--may 
contribute to improved performance when such data are used by project management to 
monitor projects (World Bank 1994: 17). Such projects would have better than average, 
i.e. non-representative, performance.  
 Second, one might speculate that managers and promoters of projects with a 
particularly bad track record regarding travel demand forecasts have an interest in not 
making traffic data available, which would then result in underrepresentation of such 
projects in the sample. Conversely, managers and promoters of projects with a good 
track record for travel demand forecasts might be interested in making this public, 
resulting in overrepresentation of these projects.  
 Third, even where managers have made traffic data available they may have 
chosen to give out data that present their projects in as favorable a light as possible. 
Often there are several forecasts of traffic to choose from and several counts or 
compilations of actual traffic for a given project at a given time. If researchers collect 
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data by means of survey questionnaires, as is often the case, there might be a temptation 
for managers to choose the combination of forecasted and actual traffic that suits them 
best, possibly a combination that makes their projects look good. An experienced 
researcher in a large European country, who was giving us feedback on our research for 
that country, commented on the data collection (the quote has been anonymized for 
obvious reasons): 
 
"Most of the [research] is based on [national railway] replies to a questionnaire. This 
is likely to create a systematic bias. [The national railways] cannot be trusted to tell 
you the truth on these matters. As you know very well, the concept of 'truth' in these 
matters is particularly fragile. The temptation for [the national railways] to take, for 
the forecasts, the number that suits them best, this temptation must be great, and I 
don't think they could resist it. What you would need [in order to obtain better data] 
would be the original forecast documents, preferably from the archives of the 
Ministry of Transportation (not [from the national railways]), that were utilised to 
take the decision." 
 
Other studies have documented the existence of such "cooking" of data (Wachs 1989, 
1990). Unfortunately, in practice it proves difficult and often impossible to gain access to 
the original forecast documents. This is why researchers sometimes have to rely on the 
second-best methodology of survey questionnaires. This is also why available data may 
not be representative data. 
 Fourth, and finally, differences in the representativity of different subsamples 
may also result in non-representative data, for instance differences between rail and road. 
 The available data do not allow an exact, empirical assessment of the magnitude 
of the problem of misrepresentation. It must be concluded, however, for the reasons 
given above, that given the current state of the art large samples of forecasted and actual 
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traffic are likely to be biased and the bias is likely to be conservative. In other words, 
accuracy in travel demand forecasts estimated from such samples would likely be higher 
than accuracy in travel demand forecasts in the project population. This must be kept in 
mind when interpreting the results from statistical analyses of inaccuracy in travel 
demand forecasting. 
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